

## The Demise of the Tank: Another Analysis

**The Tank Debate** by John Stone, Harwood Academic Publishers, Amsterdam, 2000, 201 pages, \$50.00.

John Stone, a British academician, has produced a thoughtful and balanced book on the future of the tank. Keeping in mind that prognosticating the future of armored warfare has been something of a cottage industry among British military intellectuals since 1919, this particular volume should have a longer shelf life than most, because Mr. Stone has grounded his analysis firmly on the history of the tank and the endless debate about its battlefield utility.

Mr. Stone's conclusion is that the modern battle tank — as represented by the Abrams and the Challenger — has reached an evolutionary dead-end. Not because of technology, mind you, or any future antitank 'silver bullet' that may come along, but because they are unfit for the new environment of information-based maneuver warfare. The heavy tank, in short, is akin to the dinosaur: invulnerable, but unable to survive when the swamps dried up and the weather turned cold.

The author is almost apologetic for reaching this conclusion, as he spends much of the book in explaining why past prophets of doom were proved wrong, but his logic is compelling and refreshingly original. He begins by tracing the development of Anglo-American military thought (the weakest part of the book — as if there were such a thing in the first place), but moves quickly to following the inter-relationships between battlefield performance, doctrine, and tank development as they develop across the years. He illustrates that the three have rarely been synchronized, providing ready ammunition for short-sighted critics, but western militaries have generally done an excellent job of bringing the three back into balance when one component has lagged behind the others. This has maintained the utility of the tank through Desert Storm.

He parallels this theme by following the technical race between armor and bullet (whether kinetic or chemical), showing that every advance in killing power was quickly matched by improvements in protection. He also points out that the tank has been made considerably more efficient over the years. In constant dollars, the Abrams is only twice as expensive as the Sherman, while its killing power and survivability have expanded exponentially. It is, however, twice as heavy and far more constrained by terrain trafficability.

In his concluding chapters, Mr. Stone brings together these historical and technical threads. He dismisses the argument that modern battle tanks are too expensive or

vulnerable to new weapons. Top attack and precision guided munitions are troublesome, but he is confident that countermeasures can and will be found to reduce their effectiveness. However, Abrams and Challenger are products of development processes aimed at producing centerpieces for attrition warfare on the North German Plain. Changes in doctrine, beginning with AirLand Battle and continuing through present day theories of information warfare, have renewed emphasis on operational mobility. Both tanks are too heavy and require far too long a logistical tail to fulfill a meaningful role in maneuver-based warfare. Unfortunately, it is not possible to simply lighten them in any meaningful way without destroying their effectiveness. Thus, the balance between development, performance, and doctrine is irrevocably overthrown. In other words, tanks remain kings of the battlefield — they just can't get to the next one in time. While Mr. Stone foresees an eventual 'tank-like platform' entering service, he concludes that the conventionally configured tank has outlived its usefulness.

Agree or disagree with Mr. Stone (and I have my doubts; maneuver warfare is a fine concept, but evenly matched opponents invariably end up in a slugging match), he has written a fine book which both sides can draw upon for material to fuel the never-ending tank debate.

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**Following the Tanks — Cambrai 20th November-7th December 1917** by Jean-Luc Gibot and Philippe Gorczynski. English translation by Wendy McAdam. Privately published by Philippe Gorczynski, Béatus Hotel, 59400 Cambrai, France, 1999, large format hardback, 192 pages, fully illustrated, including loose map. ISBN 2-9511696-1-2, UK price £29.95. The book is also available through Naval and Military Press, [www.naval-military-press.co.uk](http://www.naval-military-press.co.uk) for \$53.00.

The Battle of Cambrai gave tanks their first chance to operate on solid ground in the forefront of an attack. While the battle has been the subject of several books, these tend to cover the broader picture of the battle with the role of tanks included as part of the whole. The approach here is very different, as the actions of each tank are traced from original reports and accounts of those who manned them. Weaving all sources together allows this important battle to be described from the all-important point of view of the tanks. There is more than ample detail on the other arms involved, including numbers and type of guns used, support, Royal Flying

Corps squadrons overhead, and detailed orders of battle of all the divisions involved, but the tanks' part has pride of place. The text follows, as far as remaining sources allow, the actions of each individual tank during those fateful days. The location of each is recorded using a facsimile of the original operations map, suitable sections of which appear alongside the account of each section of the battle. As a bonus, these are combined as a loose map as well. Each tank is listed, noting its identification number, nickname, and commander's name. The accounts are illustrated using original photos, while contemporary color images show the ground as it appears now. This combination of accounts, photos, and maps, together with a brief suggested itinerary, make a tour of the battlefield an easy matter. Just as important are appendices which list awards made to those who took part, tank losses and, more poignantly, the locations of the graves of those who gave their lives.

This book, the culmination of many years of research, shows great attention to detail and betrays a love of subject which can only come from true enthusiasm. Not only have both authors searched records and archives, they have actually searched the battlefield to locate the remains of several of the tanks lost. As a result, it was possible to actually recover one of them! D51 DEBORAH came back to the surface in November 1998 and will be the focus of a memorial to the action and those who fought in it.

Proceeds from this book will help preserve a truly unique piece of history which is well recorded here in print.

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**The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession** by Matthew Moten. Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2000; 269 pages, \$47.95, hardcover, ISBN 0-89096-925-6.

With the characteristic academic detail of a doctoral dissertation, Matthew Moten's new book is a comprehensive study of the early development of the American Army's military professionalism, with particular emphasis on the contribution of the little-known, but influential Delafield Commission in 1855. This book is a recent addition to the Texas A&M Military History Series.

Moten is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, and is a graduate and former history instructor at West Point. His book is really the combination of two academic requirements. His analysis of the Delafield Commission appears to be his master's degree thesis, with the additional wrap-around hun-

dred-page study of West Point and antebellum military thought comprising his doctoral dissertation. The combined result is a thorough presentation of the early development of American military thought (1815-1860), which profoundly influenced the military culture and society in the Civil War.

Half of this book tells the history of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and how it contributed to professional military development as primarily a school of military engineering. Moten discusses the early philosophical rivalry between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson over the role of a professional, standing army, as well as the controversial influences of militarism, elitism, and Federalism.

Best are Moten's excellent portrayals of legendary West Point figures like Sylvanus Thayer and Dennis Hart Mahan, men who devoted their lives to the ideals of professional military education. West Point may have been the mecca of military education in the first half of the 19th century, but it also fostered a restrictive culture of branch parochialism and a stifling "system and habit of thought."

While Moten lays out the background of military thought well enough, it is his portrayal of the Delafield Commission that is the real value in this study. By 1855, Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, himself a West Point graduate, recognized the need for reform and an infusion of new ideas in the U.S. Army.

He ordered a trio of regular army officers, headed by Major Richard Delafield, to travel to the Crimea to observe the European-style war being fought by the British, French, and Turks against the Russians. The commission was also to travel in Europe, visiting England, France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, to learn of European military organization and innovation.

Delafield was to study fortifications and engineering. Major Alfred Mordecai was to study artillery and ordnance, and Captain George B. McClellan (yes, that's the one, of Civil War infamy), was to study cavalry. These three men did not get along all that well, but they were professionals and dedicated to the heavy responsibility of this diplomatic and military mission.

The commission's year-long, 20,000-mile journey was only a partial success, due to their own dithering, political delays, and travel problems. Moten's presentation, however, is both entertaining and instructive, as he describes the commission's observations, misconceptions, complaints, praises, and conclusions. Interestingly enough, he analyzes their reports both for what they did write and for what they did not include.

The Delafield Commission achieved most of what Secretary Davis intended, but because of West Point's institutional "system and habit of thought," they missed the most important opportunities. The reports became

doctrinal texts, but, as Moten points out, they lavished misguided praise on the Russian army, proscribing it as the new model for the U.S. Army to follow (despite the fact it was soundly defeated by the allies and desperately needed reform itself). They focused on tactics, not strategy, on weapons, not warfare, and on technical detail, not concepts.

This is an important work on the history of West Point, the U.S. Army, and the development of the American military profession. The Delafield Commission was a fascinating journey of discovery and misdirected intellectual thought, and it had a profound influence on the United States as it prepared itself for civil war.

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**Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall** by Joseph P. Hobbs, Second Edition, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1999, 272 pages, \$16.95.

Undoubtedly, the U.S. Army has produced some of the finest generals in the military history of the United States, and possibly the world. Among that distinguished list, two names undoubtedly can be found at the very top — Generals George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Joseph P. Hobbs' *Dear General: Eisenhower's Wartime Letters to Marshall* is an intimate portrait of these two military leaders whose combined talents led Allied armies to victory over Nazi Germany beginning in North Africa (1942), in Italy (1943), and finally in the Northwestern European Theater of Operations, starting in 1944 up through the end of that titanic struggle in May of 1945. Hobbs examines both men's contribution to victory over the Axis forces through their wartime correspondence that began in June 1942 and lasted up through V-E day in Europe on 8 May 1945. Throughout the letters Eisenhower wrote to General Marshall, one can sense not only the frustrations and many headaches associated with command of all American forces in Europe but the respect that he had for the latter's judgment and guidance in dealing with the multitude of problems in fighting a coalition war, and in dealing with subordinates (i.e., General George S. Patton, Jr.) and our British allies (Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, among others) who oftentimes would've rather preferred to fight each other than the Germans.

Prior to his description of the wartime correspondence between the two men, the author provides the reader with a brief, though concise, biographical sketch of both Generals Marshall and Eisenhower to illustrate the different career "paths" both men followed prior to their wartime relationship. General Eisenhower, a Kansan who graduated from West Point (1915), and General Marshall, from the Virginia Military Institute (1901), came from entirely different backgrounds, but each possessed strengths that

in the years ahead would bring both of them together into what can be described as one of the most remarkable command relationships in the history of the U.S. Armed Forces.

While General Marshall came from an infantry background, and Eisenhower was one of the earliest armor proponents, destiny and history propelled both men's careers inexplicably toward the relationship that developed during World War II. Yet what is even more important is the fact that the World War (1917-18), and all of its technological and operational innovations had greatly affected both Eisenhower's and Marshall's careers — particularly that of the former who, in his assignment to the Tank Infantry School at Fort Meade, and later at Camp Colt, Gettysburg, Pa., under Brigadier General Samuel D. Rockenbach, had the responsibility of training new volunteers to the Tank Corps and had come to the attention of his superiors as an outstanding young officer. It seemed that even at Camp Colt history itself had destined Eisenhower to one day command a large body of soldiers as he rose quickly during the wartime expansion to the temporary rank of lieutenant colonel to lead an estimated 10,000 soldiers by war's end in 1918.

General Marshall's career was just as meteoric, rising to become General John J. Pershing's Chief of Staff in France during the World War, and the man responsible for the first American offensive at war's end in the Meuse-Argonne. Indeed, the World War served not only to train the generation of officers that won the first major conflict of the United States in the twentieth century but also the same generation that would lead the U.S. Army to victory over both Germany and Japan in 1945. It was not until the mid-1920s, though, that Eisenhower and Marshall met, when the former had been appointed to the Battlefield Monuments Commission in Washington, D.C. After a series of staff assignments in Washington and in the Philippines, Eisenhower had seemed to reach the pinnacle of his career. Marshall, meanwhile, had gone on to make a name for himself at Fort Benning, where he implemented what became known in time as the Fort Benning or *Marshall Method* of thinking, whereby Army (and Marine) officers had been trained to "think outside the box" of conventional military operational art. It was while teaching at Fort Benning that Lieutenant Colonel Marshall noted the young officers that he deemed the future leaders of the U.S. Army in any future war.

By July 1939, Marshall had become Chief of Staff, and with war clouds gathering in Europe it became his task to begin the slow but steady task of rebuilding the U.S. Army that had slipped from the top ten at the end of the World War to that of seventeenth. In fact, by the eve of the U.S. entrance into World War II in December 1941, General Marshall had become once again acquainted with then-Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower,

who at the time had served as Major General Walter Krueger's Chief of Staff during the all-important Louisiana Maneuvers of 1940. Marshall's ever-increasing respect for Eisenhower, coupled with his abilities as a planner (on General MacArthur's staff), sent Brigadier General Eisenhower to head the Operations Division in the War Department in December 1941, and later onto England where the latter went on to command all U.S. forces in the European Theater of Operations.

One of the most important themes stressed throughout *Dear General* is the close working relationship that developed between Generals Marshall and Eisenhower, one that was built on both loyalty and trust. Throughout the different phases of the war, starting with both the initial build-up of U.S. forces in England (Bolero) in 1942-3, and eventually "Round Up," which culminated in the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944, General Eisenhower's letter to Marshall reflected the frustrations and problems in waging war over a broad front, and with subordinates and allies who proved to be even more troublesome at times than the Germans themselves. Of particular interest here is the relationship between Eisenhower, Patton, and Montgomery, and of the problems and difficulties in waging a major war with allies who differed on strategy and even tactics as they both set out to defeat the same adversary. One can see that General Marshall trusted Eisenhower's judgment on all matters so much that he gave the latter much latitude in dealing with these and other problems as the time drew near for the Normandy landings in June of 1944. Indeed, it was Marshall's trust in his subordinate that allowed Eisenhower to deal with many of the problems of command, particularly over logistics, shipping, and over command in the different theaters.

What makes this book perhaps one of the best volumes on the problems of command during World War II is the fact that it reveals Eisenhower's oftentimes stormy relationship with the British and the differing approaches to taking the fight to the Germans on the continent. Whereas the Americans preferred the direct approach via a landing in France in 1942 or 1943, the British, under the leadership of Prime Minister Churchill, favored the all too familiar indirect approach along Nazi Germany's periphery. In the end, it was the former view that ultimately defeated German military power on the continent. Though as Hobbs points out, it was Eisenhower, ever the politician, who was able to persuade, cajole, and sometimes threaten the British, who seemed determined at times to push their own politico-military strategy at the expense of their American allies. Only with General Marshall's firm support of General Eisenhower were the British, most notably Field Marshal Montgomery, forced to cooperate within an Allied strategy. This was most evident during the German Ardennes offensive (16 December 1944 - January 1945), when Montgomery sought to claim credit for a victory that even Prime Minister

Churchill squarely credited to the tenacity and skill of the American soldier.

*Dear General* is an excellent book, though at times one wishes that the author could've included a few maps to illustrate the theater of operations under discussion and the plans that Eisenhower had been sent to Europe to implement. Nonetheless, Hobbs' includes Eisenhower's many thoughts on armored warfare, which one might add are excellent and thought-provoking, particularly in his comparison of U.S. and German tanks, as well as his thoughts on conducting amphibious training and operations, and in handling personnel — from privates up through general officers (i.e., Patton, Bradley, Hodges, etc.).

This is a book that has an appeal to every interest. While it remains a story of two of the greatest soldiers ever to wear U.S. Army khaki, it is a book about waging and fighting war on all levels, with the greater emphasis on how that war was fought on the highest echelons of command, as well as how those decisions affected the individual tanker, rifleman, and logistician. It is a book that offers many lessons on combined and joint warfare through his use of Eisenhower's letters to Marshall on tactical and operational planning and warfighting, something biographies oftentimes miss or purposely ignore. Soldiers and military historians alike need to read and reread this book, for it demonstrates that the waging of war is more about personalities rather than abstract political ideas.

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**Duty First: West Point and the Making of American Leaders** by Ed Ruggero, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, New York, 2001, 342 pages, \$27.50.

What is the leader development program for cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point? Ed Ruggero, a former infantry officer and a graduate of West Point's Class of 1980, attempts to explain it in this very readable book. Ruggero's work is the latest of a vast amount of literature about West Point over the years. This book distances itself from others about West Point because it offers a current look at the Academy's leadership training as the U.S. Army makes its transition into the next century.

West Point's administration allowed Ruggero unfettered access to cadets and faculty members for an entire year. Ruggero elected to follow the lives of several plebes, and the upperclassmen that train them, from the first day of Cadet Basic Training until the graduation ceremony the following spring. He brings up some contentious issues with respect to the changes in the Academy's leadership development program and its honor code in the past decade. Without drawing any con-

clusions, Ruggero presents multiple viewpoints on these issues from both cadets and faculty members alike. Perhaps the most disconcerting thing about this book is the lack of commitment and apathy expressed by many of the cadets Ruggero interviews. Nevertheless, Ruggero also portrays other cadets and most faculty members very favorably with respect to their leadership and commitment to the U.S. Army. In the aggregate, one should still come away impressed with the leadership development experience cadets undergo at West Point after reading *Duty First*.

For the civilian interested in learning more about West Point, this work offers a vivid, non-biased account of the daily lives and attitudes of today's cadets. I would recommend *Duty First* to anyone considering attending West Point because of its rich depiction of cadet life. All readers will gain an appreciation of the first summer of military training and the cadets' numerous activities, as well as an understanding of the leadership development program the cadets experience. This book, however, has only limited value to soldiers desiring to gain greater insight into military leadership. Ruggero has demonstrated that he can point out leadership lessons in his narratives of the cadets' experiences, but his lessons are not new for most soldiers.

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**In Rommel's Backyard: A Memoir of The Long Range Desert Group** by Alastair Timpson with Andrew Gibson-Watt, Leo Cooper, South Yorkshire, England, 2000, 182 pages, \$36.95.

In June 1940, the Western Desert Force formed the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) in North Africa. For the next three years, the men of the small LRDG kept watch over Axis movements, harassed enemy convoys and supply points, and escorted numerous parties of Special Air Service (SAS) commandos to and from their targets. *In Rommel's Backyard* chronicles the exploits of one of those selected members of the LRDG, Alastair Timpson and his small group of desert warriors.

*In Rommel's Backyard* is a memoir of Timpson's exploits in the desert. He kept a detailed journal of his operations, and like many members of his generation who fought in World War II, resisted publishing them until well after the war. The editor, Andrew Gibson-Watt, does a creditable job of organizing the book and putting the operations of G Patrol into the context of the entire war in the desert as a whole. Those who have served in the desert environment of Southwest Asia and the desert of the National Training Center will empathize with Timpson and his men as they navigate the sand seas,

rocky slopes, and generally inhospitable North African desert.

The Long Range Desert Group was small, with a group headquarters, and five separate patrols of 36 men each, that normally operated in two groups. Each half of a patrol comprised four 1.5-ton Chevrolet or Ford trucks, one jeep and 18 men. Then-Captain Timpson began his duty with "G" or Guards Patrol in September 1941, serving until January 1943 when he returned to his regiment, the Scots Guards.

The soldiers of G Patrol are volunteers from the 3d Battalion Coldstream Guards and 2d Battalion Scots Guards. All the men of the patrol get their experience on the job, learning from the veteran members how to navigate by sun compass, drive across sand dunes, and avoid detection by the enemy. Timpson details clearly the training and operations of his patrol. The bulk of the narrative concerns the relentless monotony of the desert, interspersed with incredible moments of sheer terror as German and Italian aircraft strafe and harass their tiny columns; the weeks of "road watch," lying only 300 meters from the enemy's main supply routes, observing and carefully recording every Axis vehicle and cargo traveling to and from the front; the occasional attempt to attack the soft rear of the Axis supply lines; and the inevitable, yet unwelcome, reality of the death of members of the patrol.

In Timpson's private arena of war there are many moments of incredible bravery, daring escapes, and astonishing luck. One such incident is of particular note, as it epitomizes the bravery, daring, and ingenuity displayed by the LRDG patrols. With the 8th Army defending along the Gazala Line in May of 1942, Timpson's patrol was given the mission of interrupting enemy maintenance traffic along the road from Tripoli to Benghazi. As the patrol approached the road through a wadi at dusk, they noticed a large pile of stones on the side of the road, left there for repair work. Timpson formulated a simple plan: push the rocks out onto the road and create a temporary detour that looked authentic, slowing enemy traffic long enough for his patrol to place timed satchel charges in the back of each truck. The Italian drivers, however, did not cooperate, driving quickly around the "detour" before Timpson or his men could climb out of the ditch alongside the road! After several frustrating attempts at this game, Timpson brought his own truck up to the road, placed a soldier on the hood with a satchel charge, and chased enemy trucks down the road. Driving at high speed without lights, Timpson would close on the speeding Italian truck as the soldier on the hood lofted the bomb into the back. The technique worked several times, but Timpson would never know the effects of his night's work, as the patrol was discovered and chased away the next morning. It was a small incident, in a very big war, by a small group of dedicated men.

After reading the overviews of the war in North Africa, with their large-scale maps and arrows showing the movements of divisions and corps, take the time to read *In Rommel's Backyard*, and discover the incredible efforts, sacrifices, and accomplishments of a company grade officer and his 35 men, and their small but important contribution to victory in World War II. There was no micromanagement here, only the daily enervating tasks of command and decision by a young captain and his soldiers in the unforgiving desert wastes of North Africa. *In Rommel's Backyard* is the timeless story of a soldier and his part as one of the world's "Greatest Generation."

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**Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler** by John Kennedy Ohl, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000, 291 pages, bibliography, extensive notes and index, \$59.95.

In his preface, Professor Ohl notes that the history of the U.S. Army "is the history of two armies. One is the regular army consisting of professional, or career, soldiers. The other is the citizen army consisting of various components, including militiamen, volunteers, National Guardsmen, draftees, and reservists who serve on a temporary basis in times of emergency." In a similar fashion, this book is two stories: one, the story of Robert Beightler who enlisted in the Ohio National Guard, served in World War I, rose to become a major general and commanded the 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard, throughout World War II. The other is an essay that runs through the book on how Regular Army officers habitually viewed National Guardsmen as substandard soldiers and their officers as political hacks whose competence was mediocre at best. This theme is so persistent it detracts from the rest of the book, yet the primary source was Beightler himself in his letters to his family and friends!

Beightler was not just another National Guard officer. He was committed to the concept of the Guard, but he recognized that most Guard units and officers fell far short of Regular Army standards. An intelligent, ambitious and energetic man, he determined to win the approval of his RA peers and superiors. He trained his own troops to very high standards. He committed himself to the RA career pattern by winning appointments to both the Command and Staff College and the Army War College special sessions. He served on the General Staff so successfully that his six-month detail was extended to four years. When General Marshall weeded out all the old and physically unfit Guard officers in anticipation of combat, Beightler was the obvious choice to command the 37th Division.

He trained his division hard; took them to the South Pacific, to New Georgia, Bougainville and Luzon; was a visible, up-front leader who protected his troops' lives by heavy artillery preparations; and made his Guard division one of the best and most respected units in the Pacific.

But through it all, he struggled for professional recognition for himself and his division from the Regular Army generals, and he was constantly sensitive to the hostility and condescension accorded Guard officers. Yet he tended to blow every perceived slight out of proportion: if he didn't get his wishes met, he believed it was only because he was a Guard general, even though other factors may have dictated differently. A case in point: General MacArthur wanted desperately to free Manila early, but the Sixth Army Commander, General Walter Krueger, tended to move more slowly. So MacArthur visited both the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division and encouraged their commanders to race to Manila and win historic acclaim. The 37th had been fighting in Luzon for months; the 1st Cavalry was newly arrived, was mechanized and enjoyed better terrain. The Cavalry arrived in Manila at 1900, February 3 and the 37th twelve hours later. Yet Beightler was convinced for the rest of his life that obstacles had been put in his way deliberately so that a Regular Army division would win Manila instead of a Guard unit!

It was true that General Krueger openly scorned senior Guard officers and probably had a hand in denying Beightler a corps command and a third star, even while admitting Beightler was one of his best generals. And it was true that Beightler watched several general officers who had less command time and less combat service receive promotions and higher commands. Disillusioned and embittered, he blamed it all on Regular Army hostility toward the National Guard. Then, after the war, he was one of three generals offered a Regular Army general officer commission by Eisenhower. He accepted, hoping for challenging assignments. Instead, he received lesser assignments, yet continued to win high praise — but no promotion. In 1952, he suffered a heart attack and had to retire.

Reading this book makes you reflect on just how you have looked at National Guard units and their officers. My personal observations have been that they have been very, very good or very bad, with few in between. General Beightler and his troops were definitely in the very good category. This book would be good reading for each of us to alert us to any hidden bias in our own thinking, and it would be especially useful for young National Guard officers to show them that determination, professional standards, and hard work can bring them the rewards of higher command.

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