

# BOOKS

---

## Were The Odds Really Even?

by Captain Kevin W. Farrell

**When the Odds Were Even: The Vosges Mountains, October 1944-January 1945** by Keith E. Bonn, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1994. \$16.95 (paperback).

The issue raised is a good one: how did American soldiers compare to German soldiers when the materiel advantage of the Americans was not a factor? Keith Bonn believes the ideal campaign to examine for this purpose is the fighting in the Vosges Mountains from October 1944 to January 1945. In sheer numbers, the American forces did not possess an advantage, while air cover was absent on account of the weather. In his words, "This appraisal is possible because of such factors as terrain, weather, and the strategic priorities that placed the opponents in this area on a comparable operational and tactical footing (p. 12)." According to Bonn, the German Army was not composed of "invincible Aryan supermen" after all. To the contrary, the operation "provides strong evidence of the superior combat proficiency of American units (p. 12)." Simply put, the odds were even and the Americans proved themselves superior fighters.

Keith Bonn's recent work examining the Vosges Mountains Campaign has received favorable coverage within military history circles. Unfortunately, this may be more the result of the popularity of its conclusions rather than rigorous scholarship. The topic certainly deserves attention, but Bonn's argument is based on a number of inappropriate assumptions which render this analysis problematic at best. Especially troubling is the strident tone of the text in which Bonn seemingly attempts to substitute emotionally charged rhetoric for thoughtful historical insight.

The shrill tone of Bonn's work comes through early when he strongly criticizes two prominent military historians: Trevor N. Dupuy and Martin van Creveld. It is perfectly appropriate, and warranted, to question their methodology and conclusions, as it is with any historian. Both historians, especially van Creveld, have been criticized for being overly impressed by the ability of the German Wehrmacht, while their methodology has, with justification, been considered questionable. However, to accuse such men — Dupuy was a retired U.S. Army colonel and van Creveld is a professor at the University of Jerusalem — of advocating "recommendations that the contemporary U.S. Army should discard its own uniquely evolved institutions and doctrines and instead simply imitate the Wehrmacht (p.2)," is an exaggeration. Furthermore, to castigate a retired (now deceased) Army officer and an Israeli professor and to admonish them of the dangers of their political and philosophical perspectives is simply outrageous. Indeed,

Bonn's criticism of these scholars might more appropriately apply to his own work: "such books are actually most useful mainly for instruction in how not to write comparative history (p. 8)."

More troubling than the book's spiteful and amateurish writing style — for example, the simplistic and sloppy repeated reference to foreigners serving in the Wehrmacht as "turncoats" — is the underlying assumption of the work: if one recognizes the superb tactical ability of the German Wehrmacht, it is somehow demeaning to the extraordinary achievements of the American fighting man of the Second World War. This is simply wrong-headed. The notion that because the United States won the war means that its forces did everything better than the enemy is ridiculous. More ominous, it is precisely this type of thinking which limits critical and effective self-evaluation.

From the outset, *When the Odds Were Even*, is operating from a flawed assumption, stated in the book's very title. In the Vosges Mountains, the odds certainly were not as even as Bonn suggests, for as Napoleon tells us, "In war, moral considerations make up three quarters of the game: the relative balance of manpower accounts only for the remaining quarter." Despite the best intentions of Keith Bonn and others, it will be an exercise in futility to find a campaign where the "odds were even" between American and German forces in the European Theater of Operations. The German Army was in almost constant retreat, and it had suffered numerous strategic and operational setbacks, most importantly on the Eastern Front. The appropriate question is not who fought better, but how and why did the forces engaged achieve what they did.

Despite Bonn's quip, "From some accounts, indeed, one would believe that the American logistical situation was so extravagant that U.S. Army Air Force Thunderbolts routinely buried German positions under refrigerators and cartons of razor blades (p. 3);" the truth is that the American logistical situation was extravagant. It was not refrigerators and razor blades, but rather a tremendous amount of bombs, rockets, and artillery shells that shattered many German field formations and set the conditions for success in direct combat. A seemingly inexhaustible supply of M4-based armored platforms (over 100,000!) still had a very difficult time defeating German armor of all types (not just the vaunted Panther and Tiger tanks). In addition to the forces deployed and supplied in the west, the United States provided enough civil and military aid to her allies, especially the Russians, to equip hundreds of infantry divisions. The decisive theater of the war was in the east — that is where Germany suffered over 80 percent of her com-

bat losses. Part of the credit belongs to Lend Lease and hundreds of thousands of trucks and thousands of locomotives and railroad cars provided to the Soviets. Americans fought very well, especially in the latter half of the war, but it would be disingenuous to suggest that American forces were not exceedingly well supplied.

Throughout the work, Bonn repeatedly undercuts his own position. The notion that the opposing units in the Vosges were comparable in morale and capability is insupportable, even though this is the basis of the analysis. In Chapter 3, he analyzes the Battle for the High Vosges, presenting the orders of battle at several junctures in the campaign. The list of units comprising the Allied forces in the October and November campaigns reads like a "who's who" of great American units (along with perhaps the best of the Free French forces) and commanders. The 3rd, 36th and 45th Infantry Divisions were among the finest infantry divisions of any theater in the U.S. Army. They comprised the combat elements of the U.S. VI Corps, under the command of Major General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., "one of the most combat-experienced American commanders by that stage of the war (p. 71)." All three divisions were proven in combat and had seen heavy fighting, to include the relevant "frontal assaults against enemy troops entrenched in mountain defenses (p. 73)." The French 2nd Armored Division, under the command of famed French armor officer, Major General Henri Leclerc, himself a veteran of the North African campaign, was a superbly led and motivated fighting unit. Attached to the 36th Infantry Division was the 442nd ("Go For Broke" or Nisei) Infantry Regiment. Composed of Japanese-Americans, this unit was the most decorated infantry regiment in the history of the United States Army. During the course of the war, its members earned one Medal of Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 560 Silver Stars (28 Oak Leaf Clusters), over 4,000 Bronze Star Medals, and an astounding 9,486 Purple Hearts.

The Axis forces opposing, however, were comprised of a mixed bag of misfit divisions composed of the physically infirm, shattered remnants of formerly capable divisions, or obscure ad hoc units created out of desperation. Some specific examples are in order. Bonn describes the 21st Panzer Division as possessing "sound leadership and at least a modicum of cohesion (p. 81)." This may be accurate, but it is all the more remarkable considering the history of the division. After some distinguished and heavy fighting in North Africa in 1941 and 1942, it was virtually destroyed in the Second Battle of El Alamein in October and November 1942, reduced to only 12 tanks. Withdrawing across Libya, it was still able to assist in the defeat of the American

forces at Kasserine Pass before it was finally destroyed in the fall of Tunisia in May 1943. A completely new 21st Panzer Division was formed in Normandy in 1943, and the unit contained some Afrika Korps veterans, but overall it received obsolete foreign tanks and second-rate replacements. In fact, it was the only panzer division in France to be rated as unfit for service in Russia, truly a damning indictment considering the desperate need for units in the east. Despite a valiant effort, and stubborn fighting by its grenadiers, the division was mauled by the British in front of Caen. By the time it had retreated through France and was assigned to Army Group G, it was hardly a formidable fighting formation.

The 21st Panzer Division commander during the Vosges Campaign, Lieutenant General Edgar Feuchtinger, could hardly be considered the equal of most of his American opponents commanding divisions. Feuchtinger had assisted in the organization of the Nazi Party's Nuremberg rallies prior to the war and worked with the Fuhrer's secret weapons programs until he assumed command of the division in 1943. As for the assertion that by late October 1944 the division "was in the best shape it had been in since the Normandy campaign (p. 79)," Bonn offers no evidence. As for data supporting the assertion of the large number of replacement troops and equipment provided prior to the campaign, he cites the U.S. Seventh Army, *G-2 History*, 1-31 October 1944, but admits that, "Unfortunately, the account of the division commander, Edgar Feuchtinger... is too jumbled to obtain an accurate account of infantry personnel strengths, although the information included *does not deny* [emphasis added] the Seventh Army Estimates (p. 245)." Is this really sufficient evidence to show that the odds were even?

More unsettling still is the hodgepodge of irregular units composing the German force. Although I am confident that Keith Bonn is aware of the significance of the Volksgrenadier designation of most of the German infantry divisions and the high number designations of many of them, i.e., 553, he does not point out this significance to the reader, so I will. Volksgrenadier (people's grenadier) divisions were first created beginning in August 1944 in response to the desperate manpower shortages facing Germany, especially in the wake of the destruction of Army Group Center in Russia that June. The brainchild of Heinrich Himmler, the Volksgrenadier divisions represented a drastic reduction in personnel strength (barely 10,000 men as opposed to previous levels of 15,000 to 17,000) and greatly reduced offensive capability. Any division with the title Volksgrenadier means that the division was raised or refitted after August 1944. As for the number designation of the infantry divisions, it indicates the "mobilization wave" under which the division was raised — generally, the higher the number, the later in the war the division was raised. In addition, the so-called "static" or fortress divisions were of quite limited value because their members were considered unfit for service in regular units. Clearly, the vast majority of the German divisions facing the American forces came

from the lowest category of units. A few more specific examples are instructive.

Prior to being severely damaged in the invasion of Southern France, the 716th Volksgrenadier Division had been smashed by the British 2nd Army near Caen soon after the Normandy Invasion. It was a static division composed of older personnel — thus by the time the Americans faced it in the Vosges, it had been mangled and refitted twice, never having been a formidable formation in the first place. The 198th Infantry Division, one of the few older and non-Volksgrenadier Divisions involved in the campaign, had a commendable combat record. It had taken part in the invasion of Denmark and the invasion of Russia where it was continuously engaged from June 1941 until May 1944. During the fighting in Russia, it had taken part in some of the most savage operations, including the Caucasus and the Kuban bridgehead in 1941-2, Battle of Kiev in 1943, and it was encircled and broke out of the Cherkassy Pocket in 1944. After more than three and one-half years of continuous fighting, during which the division acquitted itself extremely well, it was reduced to a mere shell of its former self. After the breakout from Cherkassy, it was pulled from the line and refitted in France in May, 1944, where its replacements came from the temporary *Böhmen* division of ethnic Germans from Bohemia. Other units, such as the 360th Cossack Regiment, do not need additional comment. While reading the order of battle for the German forces, and then looking up individual unit histories in detail, the thought that kept popping into my mind was one of amazement over how well the Germans did considering the forces that they had and the ones they faced.

A final word should be said about sources. Keith Bonn admits that he had difficulty in obtaining sufficient German primary source materials. He relies overwhelmingly on U.S. documents to support his assertions and conclusions. When he does use German sources that provide a perspective different from the one he is looking for, he is dismissive of them as being, "long on excuses (*die verdammte Jabos*) [damned fighter-bombers]) and short on analysis (p. 10)." It is obvious, but still needs to be stated: U.S. unit histories are not always rigorous in terms of objectivity and analysis.

This could have been a great book. Keith Bonn is correct when he observes that this is a long-neglected operation, overshadowed by the more famous ones of the European Theater. It is too bad that he seems to believe that recognizing some excellent capabilities of the German Army of the Second World War somehow denigrates the proud and remarkable achievements of the U.S. Army. No one is arguing that Germany won the war, nor is any respectable historian even suggesting that the American effort was not outstanding. One of the recurring aspects of the German military experience has been the willingness to learn from mistakes of past wars and reacting accordingly. As much as Keith Bonn might wish to disbelieve it, the U.S. Army could stand to learn a few lessons from the German experience, while at the same time adding to and

capitalizing upon those "uniquely evolved institutions and doctrine" that make the history of the U.S. Army such a great one.

*CPT Kevin W. Farrell is an active duty Army Armor officer serving as an instructor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy. A 1986 graduate of West Point, he received his Master of Arts and Master of Philosophy degrees from Columbia University, and is currently a candidate for the Ph.D. He has commanded M1 tank units at the platoon and company level in the 1st Cavalry and 4th Infantry Divisions respectively, as well as serving in staff positions at the battalion and division level.*

\* \* \*

**Breaking the Phalanx, A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century** by Douglas A. MacGregor, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Conn., 1997. 304 pages, \$65 (hardback), \$24.95 (softcover).

Future historians of American military doctrine may well identify this book as the fulcrum point for American military thought and force structure at the turn of the 21st century. Up front, it should be noted, this is not a book for 'lightweights.' This is not a collection of war stories or a diatribe against what is wrong with the 'system' today. This book looks at the future and offers a plan. It is easy to be a naysayer; I should know, but COL MacGregor did not take the easy way. *ARMOR* readers should be warned that there is some effort required to read and digest this important work. For most of us, I would guess that the price would come first; at \$65 for the hardback, this is no cheap title (estimated softcover price will be \$25). However, if the value of a book is measured by the time required to read and understand it, then I would suggest that this is well worth the price.

In a very few pages, MacGregor advocates a total redesign of our land-based forces. His vision is an Army without divisions, one with tailored "groups," such as an air assault group and a heavy combat group. These "groups" would consist of several (5-7) battalions of the required type, and could deploy more rapidly than our current divisions. MacGregor's vision of the future suggests as many as 18 of these groups, mostly based here in the United States. Based primarily upon this he has been labeled as a 'regimentalist,' a term that he explicitly denies as applicable to his ideas.

Beyond the redesign of the force, MacGregor does what nobody else has seriously attempted since the 1980s. He takes on the training structures and doctrine of the Army. Specifically, he addresses that most sacred of cows — synchronization. In practice, the contemporary Army still treats warfare as an activity that can be carefully scripted. Because of the concerns with synchronization in operational and logistical planning, not enough attention is devoted in training to the missed or seized opportunities for battlefield success which may result from subordinate initiative

and new fighting techniques and tactics. MacGregor takes this issue on. One should also remember that this book appeared before the new Draft 100-5. It now forms a portion of the discourse upon the concepts embodied in the new doctrine.

This is a well-written book that the professional Army leaders of today and tomorrow need to use and consult as they consider the uncertain future. If there are any shortcomings at all, I would say that it comes in the area of information and its applications in the future. In this area, MacGregor is both a little too positive and too vague about how anything beyond tactical communications affects our forces. He uses a hypothetical scenario to describe how a conflict might unfold once the Army adopts his force structure. Although he mentions CNN early in his scenario, that is the last significant point at which he notes the interaction and role of non-military communications/information upon the military. Admittedly, this is a book about the Army and landpower, and so perhaps information is a little beyond the scope. But given the quality of treatment for the other topics he addressed, I personally would have liked to see more on this subject from him. In MacGregor's book, satellites are never shot down, CNN doesn't show up on the battlefield, the BBC doesn't broadcast from your assembly area, and some pissed off private with a wireless satellite modem doesn't send the group OPORD out to the world via the Internet 12 hours prior to execution. These are potential show-stoppers for the Army of the next century, regardless of the structure.

With any luck, they will form the basis of Macgregor's next book.

ROBERT L. BATEMAN  
CPT, Infantry  
Westerville, Ohio

**Steel Inferno: 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy** by Michael Reynolds, Sarpedon, New York, 1997. 352 pages, \$27.50.

Michael Reynolds' *Steel Inferno* is an excellent addition to the history of fighting in July and August 1944 and a first rate history of the 1st SS Panzer Corps' chief units, the 1st SS (Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler) and the 11th SS (Hitler Jugend). Coming on the heels of *The Devil's Adjutant*, a biography of Jochen Peiper (sic), this latest effort establishes Reynolds as the best contemporary historian of the German SS. A retired British officer, Reynolds' motivation is to determine why the SS fought so well even when greatly reduced. Specifically, Reynolds sets out to learn how did these units, and the German Army generally, maintain cohesion and continue to produce outstanding combat results under the worst possible conditions and in the face of heavy casualties.

*Steel Inferno* is a success on a number of counts. First it is a great read. Reynolds likes to recount combat actions and weaves after-action reports and interviews into a great guns

and battles account. His own experiences in combat and training, while not imposed on the reader, do inform his account. Reynolds knows his business and is able to interpret historical events in a way which educate and entertain those of us who are students of our profession. General Reynolds does not apologize for the SS. Indeed, he takes the allegations of SS atrocities head-on. Not surprisingly, he concludes that there is evidence to support some of the allegations, but by no means all of them. Reynolds also illuminates the great characters of the SS including Peiper, Kurt Meyer, Michael Wittmann (the leading tank ace of World War II among all armies) and others. Reynolds is particularly effective in making Kurt Meyer, commander of the 12 SS, come alive. Kurt Meyer and his fellow division commander in the Corps, Teddy Wisch, were first-rate tactical commanders who had risen literally from the ranks through the SS.

To a large extent, these two officers were the epitome of the SS and archetypes of what the SS expected of its officers. Both were committed Nazis and committed to the combat arm of the party. Equally, they were brilliant soldiers who understood the synergy of combined arms operations, and exemplified the combined arms tenets of the Blitzkrieg. But they were also committed to effective training, and were first-class leaders. To a large extent, their story answers Reynolds' thesis question. SS units were cohesive for several reasons. First, the leadership was devoted to the followers. The Wehrmacht was, by comparison to the Allied armies, the hallmark of egalitarian principles. Both the Heere, or Army, and the SS led the way among the German services in doing away with the old Junker tradition of officer privilege. In the SS, officers led from the front, and were expected to be technically and tactically competent. Teddy Wisch and Kurt "Panzer Meyer" were all of these things. Add to this the surprising longevity of a coterie of key leaders in the SS, and the pattern of SS success begins to emerge. Wisch, Panzer Meyer, Peiper, and many others were involved in all of the major campaigns of the German Army and fought on both fronts. When their time came to lead large tactical units, they were ready to do so. Finally, all were good trainers in an army which believed in live-fire combat training to an extent no other contemporary army attempted.

Michael Reynolds' book is useful reading for the Armor force. Reynolds' accounts of training, planning, and execution in the SS illustrate patterns of behavior that produced success and demonstrate considerable flexibility. Our own army could do worse than emulate these positive aspects of the SS. Equally important, SS officers led from the front. Though they relied on subordinates to fight the close battle, they went forward to see conditions in the field for themselves. For all of these reasons, Michael Reynolds' *Steel Inferno* belongs on the book shelves of the Armor Force.

COL GREGORY FONTENOT  
Commander, BCTP  
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

**The Last Hundred Yards: The NCO's Contribution To Warfare** by H.J. Poole, Posterity Press, 1996. 400 pages, \$19.95 (softcover).

Despite skillful lip service and good intentions, the U.S. military system of training for ground combat has not yet embraced the art of maneuver warfare at the infantry squad level. When we speak of maneuver warfare, we generally speak of armored and mechanized forces thundering around on widespread exploitation of enemy gaps and weaknesses. The infantry squad today is given little credit for independent thought and action, and its NCOs get no credit at all for innovation and resourcefulness.

*The Last Hundred Yards* is Poole's dedicated effort to apply maneuver warfare concepts to the infantry squad, to allow the infantry NCO to fight smarter, with fewer casualties, increasing the odds for tactical success on the modern battlefield. Poole is a retired Marine lieutenant colonel with extensive infantry experience, both as an NCO and an officer. Since "the last hundred yards in combat is the purview of the NCO," Poole's message is clear — small unit leaders must be trained and allowed to think for themselves.

Even with an attractive cover, stylish production, and a snappy foreword by maneuver warfare guru Bill Lind, the book is really a training manual, a classy FM. Explaining how maneuver warfare concepts (intent, initiative, aggressiveness, offensive spirit, etc.) apply to small unit tactics, techniques, and leadership is not easy, and Poole takes 26 chapters to get his points across. Front-loaded with theory, rhetorical questions, and historical examples, the majority of chapters focus on the tactics and techniques of maneuver warfare application for the NCO and the small infantry unit in a wide variety of tactical scenarios. Poole includes an inventory test, guidelines for free-play exercises, a glossary, and a useful bibliography.

The real meat of his book, however, is contained in the many chapters of NCO tactical application. Poole adequately covers the subjects you would expect — close air support, hasty and deliberate attacks, the defense, anti-armor ambushes, and NCO warfare. He really scores big with chapters on patrolling, the point man, indirect fire, the counter-ambush, and short-range infiltration. "The Ultimate Ambush" offers ingenious and simple tricks for ambushing a much larger force and getting away. Refreshingly, Poole is also a strong advocate of the night attack, and he proposes outstanding techniques for overcoming our psychological fear of the dark, making darkness an ally and a combat multiplier, and for resolving land navigation problems at night. He also provides lengthy and detailed, but much needed, chapters on urban warfare. "The Unbeatable Urban Defense" is a clever and sensible approach coupled with sound fundamentals.

Poole is right — maneuver warfare concepts can be successfully employed by the infantry NCO and his squad, if only we would train to

that goal and then let the NCO be the master of execution and his situation at the squad level. For its valuable message and contribution to modern combat training, this volume still has serious defects. Since it is an FM, it reads like one — wordy, short on anecdotal lessons, but long on quotes by Sun Tzu, Frederick the Great, and Rommel. There are no photos. All the maps and illustrations are poor-quality, dot-matrix reproductions from other FMs, blurry and indistinct. And, at 400 pages, its size and length do not propose a quick read.

Still, Poole is on target. Combat is elusive, fluid, violent, uncertain, surprising, paralyzing, loud, and pretty damn scary. Maneuver warfare kills fewer friendlies and can greatly increase the odds for tactical success, especially for those infantrymen who are face-to-face with the enemy. Doctrine is fine, but blind doctrine is fatal, and we need to adapt our training to permit our small unit infantry NCOs to be mentally flexible, bold, and audacious, with the authority and confidence to make sound decisions and then act on them. And this book is a good start.

COL WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL  
USMC, Retired  
Sebascodegan Island, Maine

**Fields of Battle, The Wars for North America** by John Keegan, Alfred A. Knopf Inc., New York, N.Y., 1996. 334 pages, \$30.00 (hardcover).

John Keegan is one of the most highly respected military historians of our times. His latest work, *Fields of Battle*, focuses on the wars that made North America what it is today.

*Fields of Battle* is unusual in that Mr. Keegan uses his personal and professional travels in North America to explain why he writes about American military history, and as the link between battles decades apart in time. Some may find these personal anecdotes distracting or tedious, but they serve a very important purpose: they stress the importance of North America's history, the geography that drove American and Canadian expansion and conflict, and the unique nature of America itself.

This book opens with Mr. Keegan describing his experiences of, travels in, and feelings for North America. This leads inevitably to a discussion of the colonists who brought European "civilization" to the Americas and who fought over the vast land they called home. The following chapters cover the subsequent wars in North America, focusing on specific battles. Mr. Keegan masterfully covers the battles of Quebec, Yorktown, the Peninsula, and the Little Big Horn.

*Fields of Battle* offers a great deal to the professional soldier or historian. If nothing else, this book is valuable for its insights into the military geography of North America and the driving forces behind American expansion and warfare. For these things, if no other, this book comes highly recommended.

For this author, *Fields of Battle* is doubly meaningful. I have always tended to regard American military history as, for some reason, less interesting or significant than European military history. With typical human contempt for the familiar, I failed to appreciate (or even comprehend) the significance of the many battlefields and historical sites within a few hours' drive from my New Jersey home: Princeton, Trenton, Brandywine, Valley Forge, Monmouth, and Gettysburg, among others. Mr. Keegan treats these places just as he treats places like Agincourt, Waterloo, the Somme, Caen, Omaha Beach, and Falaise. Thanks to *Fields of Battle*, I will never again fail to appreciate the battlefields of America, or the soldiers who fought there. Nor will I fail to appreciate the fact that, for over 130 years, we in America's Armed Forces have kept from our beloved soil the scourge of modern warfare.

CPT ROBERT S. KRENZEL JR.  
Assistant S3  
2-37 Armor  
Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia

**To Hasten the Homecoming: How Americans Fought World War II Through the Media** by Jordan Braverman, Madison Books, Lanham, Maryland, 1996. 276 pages, \$24.95 (hard cover).

Much has been written about World War II: the battles, the generals, the various theaters of operations, and the requisite summary of equipment used. So another book about World War II would not necessarily pique someone's interest.

But, this is not another book about World War II. It is not a book about the battles. It is not a book for those looking for answers to strategic or tactical questions. Clausewitzians can search elsewhere for their cup of "On War."

No, this is a book about the other theater of operations — the home front. It is also of a global information environment routed through vacuum tubes, newspaper, and newsreels.

Jordan Braverman takes a unique look at how Americans fought World War II at home. How did America live through those tumultuous years? While the conflagration was raging in the Far East, while the V2s were buzzing over London, what was Smallville, USA doing?

Braverman's Smallville setting is Lorna Road, Mattapan, Massachusetts. Lorna Road could be any road in any town in America. But, it was his road for this war. The author provides insightful information about the attitudes of those at home and what people were doing to help the war effort. "In 1944, our schools financed 2,900 planes, 33,000 jeeps, 600 amphibious jeeps, and 11,600 parachutes." According to Braverman's account, the financing came from the buying of stamps and bonds by school children from across the country.

Braverman does an excellent job of chronicling the growing medium of media by provid-

ing the reader the context of that chronology against the backdrop of historical engagements. And through that chronology he provides insights to what Americans were doing to support the war effort. It almost has the feel of a textbook with each chapter able to stand on its own. Yet, there is a very real sense that a story is being told.

Braverman describes the different aspects of the media and how that media transmitted information to its publics. He describes the fighting, not in the foxholes but in such struggling government agencies as the Office of War Information. He tells of the agencies that sprang up throughout World War II, struggling to determine how or what information to provide the public.

A 1942 poll revealed that Americans knew very little about the war. Almost fifty percent said they did not know why the war was being fought, and nearly a third would negotiate peace with Germany.

It was through the radio, music, theater, books, cartoons, and advertising that America lived the experience of World War II. It was through that medium that the U.S. government brought the war to the home front and informed that fifty percent.

"Radio was everywhere — at home, at work, and in the automobile. Listeners were only as far away from news, entertainment, laughter, tears, and mystery as the flick of a switch."

*To Hasten the Homecoming*, is a book worth reading, a book worth keeping.

BENJAMIN B. SANTOS  
LTC, Armor  
Public Affairs Officer  
III Corps and Fort Hood

**Fighting the Bolsheviks: The Russian War Memoir of Private First Class Donald E. Carey, U.S. Army, 1918-1919**, edited by Neil G. Carey, Presidio Press, Novato, Calif., 1997. 240 pages, \$24.95 (hardcover).

Russian war memoir of a U.S. soldier? This question may be asked in reaction to the subtitle of *Fighting the Bolsheviks*. U.S. Army soldiers of the 339th Infantry Regiment did serve in the Allied force that intervened in Russia following the Russian Revolution. U.S. soldiers fought, killed, and were killed by Bolshevik soldiers. PFC Carey's memoir is valuable primary history that serious students of World War I should consider reading. PFC Carey's diary is detailed and well-written, requiring very little editing. It is however, not gripping or thought-provoking in the manner of *All Quiet on the Western Front*: the researcher looking for details of U.S. Army service on the Archangel Front will not be disappointed, but the average reader will be. Details of guard duty, drill, inspections, and troop movements written in journal form are not in themselves inspiring. *Fighting the Bolsheviks* is for the serious historian researching or interested in the Allied in-

---

tervention; those with a passive interest in the topic would be better served by a secondary source history, such as Maddox's *The Unknown War with Russia*, or Rhodes' *The Anglo-American Winter War with Russia*.

CPT JERRY A. HALL  
Fort Knox, Ky.

**Leadership Secrets of the Rogue Warrior** by Richard Marcinko, Pocket Books, New York, N.Y., 1996. 155 pages, \$14.00 (paperback).

If a newly-commissioned lieutenant were to apply the principles outlined in the book *Leadership Secrets of the Rogue Warrior* to his tank platoon, he would fail miserably. The book does not follow many of the principles of leadership outlined in FM 22-100 *Military Leadership*.

*Leadership Secrets of the Rogue Warrior* contains Mr. Marcinko's Ten Commandments of SpecWar (a term he uses for Special Warfare). There is a chapter for each of the commandments. In each chapter the author follows the same three-part format. The author discusses a particular commandment in the first part of the chapter to explain why the commandment is important. He then discusses examples of how this commandment has been applied to the environments of both war and business in the remainder of the chapter. The author is directing his message to those in the business community who lack their own individual leadership skills.

The examples from his military endeavors were mostly from what the author claims were his own experiences, some of which I thought were a bit difficult to believe. The example he gives of conducting a HALO jump at sea and opening his chute at the masthead of his ship (138 feet above the deck), was the most difficult to believe. Readers should consider some of the material in this book with a grain of salt, but can appreciate the author as a very talented story-teller.

The book contains no pictures or diagrams. It does however, contain most of the clichés and pearls of wisdom I learned from my drill sergeant. Most of the words are just as small, too, so the writing style is easy to read. Additionally, the author displays all the vanity that my drill sergeant did.

*Leadership Secrets of the Rogue Warrior does have some merit; it is interesting reading for those who like Rambo-type fiction. There are numerous reputable books on leadership which could be studied by serious students of the subject, but this is not one of them. I would only recommend this book to leaders who have already proven themselves, and desire some entertainment.*

ROBERT E. LEVERINGTON, JR.  
1LT, Armor, USAR  
Operation Joint Guard  
Sarajevo, BiH